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We evaluate the accuracy of power indices by experimentally measuring the political power 
embodied in blocks of votes per se. The experiment incorporates several subjects interacting in 
online chat rooms under supervision. Chat rooms and processes for selecting subjects reduce or 
eliminate extraneous political forces leaving logrolling as the primary political force. Results 
show that two standard power indices reflect voting power while other power indices and 
proportionality do not. 
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For over half a century scholars, practitioners and courts have struggled to understand the 
relationship between sizes of voting blocks and influence over democratic decisions (see 
Felsenthal and Machover 1998 for an overview). This relationship has come to be formalized as 
‘power indices’. Power indices are abstract mathematical representations of the ability of voters 
to affect group decisions focusing on votes per se, in isolation from other political considerations 
such as resources, traditional alliances, charismatic leadership, or shared agendas. The effort to 
refine power indices continues as theoretical efforts have not satisfactorily matched empirical 
results (Felsenthal and Machover 1998, 1995; Gelman, Katz and Bafumi, forthcoming). Indeed, 
a founder of the theory remains active developing new theoretical approaches (Burgin and 
Shapley 2001). Previous literature has been unable to resolve whether the unsatisfactory practical 
performance of indices is due to the complexity of real world political environments, or due to 
defects in the mathematical logic of the indices themselves (Felsenthal and Machover 1995).  
This paper presents the first empirical evidence that the mathematical logic of some power 
indices substantially captures voting power as manifested in a human institution.   
 
Voting power is not a proportionate or simple translation of the size of voting blocks. 
Consider the following examples. Suppose there are four players with 55, 40, 3, and 2 votes each 
and a majority of at least 51 votes decides the outcome. We call them ‘players’ for simplicity 
since the real world versions can be political parties, shareholders, countries and so forth. In 
compact notation we write the vote information as {51; 52, 38, 6, 4}. The first player can 
determine all decisions and so has 100% of the electoral power while the others have none. With 
the profile {51; 45, 45, 6, 4} any two of the first three players can form a majority of votes, and 
the fourth cannot help any other players form a majority. Thus, the power in this case divides 
between the four players as follows: 33 1/3%, 33 1/3%, 33 1/3% and 0%. The first three players 
have equal power even though they are different in their votes, while the latter two with similar 
numbers of votes are very different in power. The fourth party is called a ‘dummy player’ 
because it cannot turn a losing coalition into a winning coalition. The power indices
3  –  Shapley-
Shubik (1954 and Shapley 1953) , Banzhaf  (1965) and Penrose (1946), Johnston (1977, 1978), 
                                                 
3 Defined in Section 2.  
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Burgin-Shapley (2001), Deegan-Packel (1978), Intervals (Taylor  and  Zwicker 1997), Holler-
Packel (1983), etc – agree with these interpretations. When the number of players increases, 
results become more complex and different indices can yield different outcomes, even opposite 
rankings of power (Saari and Sierberg 1999). 
 
The aim of this paper is to measure experimentally the level of power held by blocks of 
voters. Specifically, we: 
 
•  Establish a practical, ethically responsible experimental procedure. 
•  Create an artificial environment in which power indices should work, that is an 
environment isolated from traditional alliances, adversaries, charismatic leaders, etc. 
•  Empirically measure the voting power of the various players in several weighted vectors 
of votes. 
•  Establish which, if any, power indices accurately reflect voting power in an environment 
isolated from other political considerations.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 defines and explains the power indices. 
Section 3 presents the preliminary design of the experiment. Section 3 describes controls for 
variations among individual participants. Section 4 details the final form of the experiment. 
Section 5 presents and analyses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. POWER INDICES 
 
The central idea of power indices is that votes drive decision making in an environment 
effectively isolated from other political forces (Felsenthal and Machover 1998). In the world of 
power indices, players face a series of independent decisions, the players share no history, they 
have no overlap in their interests, they differ in their votes, but the players are all identical in 
other respects.  
 
Power indices address two aspects of voter power called I and P power by Felsenthal and 
Machover (1998).  The experiments we present address P power. P power is the capacity to 
capture a portion of a fixed sum of political rewards or purse, ‘measured by that [player’s] 
expected or estimated share in the fixed purse’ (pg 36). Examples of P power include the ability 
to control a portion of ministerial seats within a coalition government, receiving for one’s 
constituency ‘pork barrel’ government funding, and in our specific experiments, the power to 
capture money from a fixed pool.   
For clarification by contrast, I power addresses the capacity to influence the outcome of a 
binary decision (Felsenthal and Machover 1998, 36), such as selecting one of two candidates for 
CEO or passage of a bill legalizing cannabis.   Many real world applications combine P and I 
power, e.g. a university board creating a strategic plan mixing various levels of funding for many 
alternative priorities. 
 
2 Standard Voting Power Indices Work: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Voting Power   
The Shapley-Shubik Index is the oldest P power index.  Shapley (1953) developed an abstract 
measure of the value of playing a game based upon three assumptions
4.  1) The game is abstract, 
that means that it is the number of votes controlled by a player that matters, not the player’s 
personality, name, or other characteristic.  2) The game is efficient in that all possible gains are 
captured.  3) If two independent games are merged, then the value for each player in the merged 
game equals that sum of that player’s value in the two games played separately.  That is, value of 
two lottery tickets from different games, when purchased as a package, equals the sum of the 
values of the two tickets separately.  Clearly, this assumption does not fit all games, for example 
two tickets from the same lottery when the purchase of the second ticket marginally reduces the 
probability of the first ticket winning.  
 
“It is remarkable that no further conditions are required to determine the value uniquely” 
(Shapley 1953, 309).  However, these are sufficient conditions, not necessary ones.  As Shapley 
1953 notes, other sets of sufficient conditions exist.  By formula, the Shapley value φ  for a 
player i is:  
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where v is a game expressed as a set function, S is a set of players, N is a carrier of S i.e. S 
together with any dummy players, s and n are the sizes of S and N.  
 
This formula equates to an algorithm. Start all players with a value of zero. List all 
permutations of players. For each permutation, sum the players’ votes starting from the left and 
note which player’s votes change the sum from less than the majority to at least the majority. 
Each time a player changes a subset of players from losing to winning, increase that player’s 
value by one.  This algorithm generalizes to games with payoff values of other than all or 
nothing (1 or 0 above). In general, whenever a player’s votes change the payoff for a subset of 
players within a permutation, add the change of payoff to the value for that player. 
 
Shapley and Shubik (1954) apply the Shapley Value to politics.  They normalize the Shapley 
value so that the sum of all players’ values equals one, by dividing each player’s value by the 
sum of all players’ values.  This normalized form of the Shapley value is the Shapley-Shubik 
power index.  
 
Banzhaf (1963, pg 331 note) rejects the Shapley-Shubik index on the intuitive ground that 
using permutations implies that order of matters in the index, but is not essential in real political 
situations.  He rejects the use of permutations and substitutes combinations in their place, thus 
replicating the method of Penrose (1946) and anticipating Coleman (1971) according to Felsental 
and Machover (1998). The Banzhaf index is defined by an algorithm. List all combinations of 
players. Identify the subset of combinations in which the total number of shares equals or 
surpasses the majority required in their corporation. Within this subset, count each time a player 
was pivotal, that is the player could, by leaving the combination, reduce the total number of 
                                                 
4 The number of assumptions is somewhat contentious as Shapley specifies superadditivtiy in defining his 
value but does not use it in deriving the value, nor is the Shapley value superadditive generally. See 
Felsenthal and Machover 1998, 225 for example. 
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shares to less than the required majority. Each player’s Banzhaf value, normalized as an index, is 
their count as a percentage of the total count for all players (Banzhaf 1965). The Banzhaf power 
index addresses I Power (Felsental and Machover 1998) 
 
Johnston (1977, 1978), again on intuitive grounds, objected to ascribing full power to whichever 
players were pivotal. Instead, Johnston awards each player value in proportion to the reciprocal 
of the number of pivotal players in the coalition. Further, Johnston considers a player pivotal if it 
can turn a winning coalition into a losing one by withdrawing from the coalition. Instead 
Johnston’s method is to list all combinations of players and sum, for each player and each 
coalition, the reciprocal of the number of pivotal players in the coalition. These sums for each 
player are then normalized to create an index. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider 
Johnston’s intent to have been measuring I power.   
 
The Burgin-Shapley (2001) index is like the Johnston index as being an intentional modification 
of Banzhaf’s index, and also in its algorithm. For Johnston, a player is pivotal if it can break a 
winning coalition, and for Burgin-Shapley a player is pivotal if it can turn a losing coalition into 
a winner. The Burgin-Shapley index is apparently intended to measure I power.   
 
 
3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
Power indices estimate the power embodied in blocks of votes that allows voters to negotiate 
using those votes, with no shared interests between voters and no other differences between 
voters. Natural environments such as international organizations, legislatures, or board rooms 
may be unsuited for direct evaluations of power indices because voters in those environments 
differ in many dimensions and often share interests. The experiment we describe below 
approximates the conditions that underlie power indices.  
 
These experiments consist of several subjects
5 taking the roles of players and meeting in an 
online chat room with two supervisors who assign some number of votes to each player. The 
players then divide a lump sum of money between themselves by simple majority-vote rule. This 
assignment of votes and distribution of money was repeated twelve or twenty-four times in each 
session of experiments. Each assignment of votes and distribution of money is called a round.  
 
Consider an example. One player may receive eight votes while the others receive three each, 
with a majority of 12 required to determine the division of the money; {12;8,3,3,3,3,3}. For 
convenience identify the players with letters consecutively from A (with 8 votes). For example 
consider a division of $10. Player A may propose to divide the money evenly with B and C. 
Players D, E and F could reply with a proposal to allow B to have four dollars and accept two 
dollars each. If each player has strictly less than half the votes, no matter how the players divide 
the money, there is always a majority that can benefit from a different division of the money.  
 
Distribution of actual money was imperative in the experiments in order to maintain subjects’ 
interest and motivate active participation. See Smith (1982) for more on the role of sufficient 
                                                 
5 The term ‘subject’ applies to persons involved in our experiments while the term ‘player’ refers to an abstract role in 
a game.  
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returns for effort and other practical elements of social-scientific laboratory experiments. The 
Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee, citing broader Australian standards, 
questioned the appropriateness of financial compensation for participants in experiments. Their 
concern centred on the possibility of undue coercion. Other standards, for example the American 
Anthropological Association (1986), state presumption in favour of compensation. We resolved 
the conflict by setting the amount of money to be divided at a level that would result in subjects 
receiving on average an hourly income approximating that of an undergraduate research assistant 
as the subjects were all undergraduates at our university. Pre-study debriefings and observations 
of play showed $15 per round to motivate subjects and result in an appropriate hourly 
compensation. 
 
Chat rooms permit political negotiation based upon logrolling (making deals based upon 
ones’ votes or ‘I agree to vote for something you want in return for you agreeing to vote for 
something I want Tullock 1976 in Johnston 1977) in an environment with greatly reduced effects 
from factors other than votes. Side deals and threats are obvious and avoidable in supervised chat 
rooms. Personality and charisma have much less potential for influence when deals must be 
made using brief formalised statements. Subjects may be anonymous in chat rooms. In these 
experiments, player’s identities in the chat rooms consist of a number shared by all players in a 
particular game and a letter unique to each player (see the screen examples in Appendix 2).  
 
During a pre-study and after several experiment sessions we debriefed subjects, proctors and 
recorders. They reported that the experiment procedure was easy to understand and apply, and 
that the chat room package was familiar.  They reported that subjects were effectively 
anonymous through at least several rounds of play, which was also our experience when we 
supervised games. During the pre-study, one set of participants reported that they identified one 
of the participants during the game. This identification arose from that subject making an online 
comment in a characteristic, personal manner while idle between games. We instituted a policy 
of no chatting between games or rounds, discouraging side comments, and increasing the pace of 
the games. Proctors and recorders reported consistently during debriefings that they ‘seldom 
knew’ the identity of the players and were ‘usually wrong’ when they thought they new. We 
conclude that the subjects were effectively anonymous. For further protection of anonymity, we 
changed the identity of the players every six rounds.  
 
4. PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
We collected a variety of control data on the subjects in order to control for possible effects: 
gender, nationality, psychosocial and risk orientation (Table 1).  Psychosocial orientation 
measures individuals’ preferences for receiving payments in comparison with payments to others 
(Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, and Joireman 1997). This Van Lange et al instrument divides 
subjects into three broad orientations
6. Individualist subjects prefer to receive a higher payment 
for themselves without regard to payments received by others. Competitive subjects prefer to 
receive as much more than others as possible, even to the extent of accepting a lower payment 
for themselves to gain even lower payments to others. Pro-social subjects prefer the highest total 
for payments to themselves plus those to others; at least they will accept a somewhat decreased 
payment to themselves in order to gain more for others. 
                                                 
6 Thanks to Dr. Janine Webb, School of Psychology, Deakin University for this advice and other guidance. 
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Based upon pre-study results we concluded that subjects with a competitive psychosocial 
orientation posed a threat to the experiment as they were so interested in reducing others’ income 
that they would accept lower incomes for themselves in order to do so.  Such behaviour is 
inconsistent with the self-serving behaviour assumed by power indices.  Therefore, we excluded 
competitive subjects from the study.  We also excluded those who gave inconsistent responses to 
the psychosocial instrument.  Thus our subjects consisted of individualist and pro-social subjects.  
The potential magnanimity of pro-social subjects was potentially problematic for the study.  We 
assured the subjects that all had an equal potential to earn money based upon their votes. 
 
We also limited the subjects to those with apparent proficiency in English as pre-study results 
showed foreign nationality to affect earnings and debriefings suggested language ability to be the 
key issue in low foreigner performance. 
 
We attempted to eliminate the effect of social orientation by structuring the experiments such 
that all subjects would receive approximately equal voting power over the course of the game. 
Thus, structural equity could replace the perceived need for subjects to pursue equity. Our 
subject instructions (Appendix 2) assured all subjects that the games were fair and that anyone 
temporarily in a weak position would be in a strong position later. The instructions also explicitly 
encouraged subjects to be self-centred or ‘greedy’. This mechanism and encouragement was 
apparently effective as subjects with a pro-social psychosocial orientation received at least as 
much as did competitive subjects (Table 1).  
 
We used a simple test (Appendix 1) to test for attitude toward risk: aversion, love, or 
neutrality.  We found that gender, risk aversion, psychosocial orientation and national origin did 
not affect earnings significantly in either the statistical or practical sense.  Coefficients on those 
variables were both small and insignificant (Table 1). For more detail of on the control of 
potential variation see (Geller and Mustard 2004)   
 
Experience should matter in performance. In the pre-study, we tracked experience in order to 
document the length of the learning process, if experience continued to matter over time or if 
gains from experience were captured within a few trials of the game. Consistent with previous 
works (for example Kelly and Arrowood 1960; Komorita and Moore 1976), six rounds of play 
appeared to impart enough experience for proficient play. Inexperienced subjects sometimes 
focus upon other player’s total votes as a proxy for their value in a game. However after only a 
few rounds, subjects focus upon sets of players that can form winning coalitions. They see 
beyond the veil of numbers of votes to the potential for alliance. Inexperienced subjects may 
consider the player with eight votes to be more powerful in {12;8,3,3,3,3,3}
7 than in 
{22;8,7,7,7,7,7). After even a half a dozen rounds playing for money, subjects treat them as 
equivalent – the largest and any two players can win as can any four smaller players. In our 
analysis we limited our observations to those in which all subjects had already participated in a 
practice round and at least six rounds for money.   
 
 
                                                 
7 Recall that this notation means that 12 votes are sufficient to win, one player has eight votes and five have three 
votes each. 




We distributed the subjects widely in a classroom style computer laboratory.  We maintained 
at least one computer between every two subjects and seated subjects in the same experimental 
group more distantly. Each computer used by a subject had chat rooms for two player identities, 
permitting rapid change of identities between series of rounds. The proctor and recorder for each 
group of six players shared a computer, participating in the chats as a single individual. We 
copied files to each proctor’s computer giving the listings of votes to be used each round and 
typical messages used during the rounds. We distributed to each recorder a hardcopy sheet 
giving the votes for each player and majorities required for each round as backup and 
verification against electronic records.  
 
When the subjects arrived we sorted them into relatively homogeneous groups based on social 
orientation, risk orientation, gender, and nationality. We then assigned the subjects to computers 
without them knowing each other’s player identities. When new subjects were participating, we 
provided instructions on the game and played a practice round without money.  The instructions 
(Appendix 2) included procedures, rules of the game, suggestions on strategies, and that fifteen 
dollars would be divided each round.  The subjects were students in the university and were 
familiar with the use of the chat rooms because the platform was used for educational purposes 
or student communication throughout the university.  After we provided instructions, each group 
of six players ran independently.  
 
Subjects within each group had the same information, communicating entirely though chat 
room windows shared by all group members. At the beginning of each round, the proctor 
submitted a message to one window, labelled ‘Group Chat’, on the subjects’ monitors saying to 
wait and do nothing until further notice (Appendix 2 has screen examples). Second, the proctor 
sent a message to another window, labelled ‘Vote Vector’, on each subject’s monitor giving the 
votes for each player and majority required for that round. All subjects in the group saw the same 
message and each knew the votes of all players in their group. This was the only message each 
round sent to the Vote Vector window. Third, the proctor sent a message to the Group Chat 
requesting that the subjects confirm their votes. Each subject responded with the number of votes 
assigned to them that round. The proctor and recorder confirmed each number of votes with the 
data file and hardcopy sheet, correcting any errors.  
 
The proctors submitted a message to each Group Chat to begin the games. Subjects submitted 
messages proposing, rejecting, revising, or accepting various divisions of the money. Subjects 
could write plain English statements, use conventional chat room abbreviations, or use brief 
notation provided during the instructions for the game. Any subject proposing a division of 
money had to identify that proposal uniquely, using their player identification letter followed by 
a number. They were not permitted to use threats, deals for anything other than divisions of 
money that round, or statements that would reveal personal information. We authorised proctors 
to end a round without any payment to enforce the rules, but they never had to exercise such a 
punishment. Recorders and proctors watched the messages for the emergence of a consensus, a 
difficult task requiring two people. When subjects appeared to have reached a majority decision, 
the proctors would wait briefly and submit a call for votes. Each subject could then submit a 
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message stating which proposal he or she supported. The proctor and recorder then counted the 
votes. Subjects could change their acceptance of a proposal if they wished at any time until the 
proctor ended the round. If there was no winner, the proctor sent a message saying to continue 
negotiating. When a proposal received enough votes, the proctor sent a message saying that the 
round was over, which proposal won, and instructing the subjects to send no further messages 
until the next round started.  
 
When each round ended the recorder wrote how much each player received on the hardcopy 
sheet and the proctor confirmed the record with the messages in the Group Chat. After each six 
rounds, the proctors submitted messages instructing subjects to close their Group Chat and Vote 
Vector and open the alternative version of each to proceed for six more rounds with a new 
identity.  
 
At the end of 12 or 24 rounds, we ended the game and we tallied each subject’s winnings. We 
paid them precisely to five cents, the smallest denomination coin in Australia. We collected a 
receipt which included each subject’s player identities during the game. While they waited for 
payment we listened to their conversation and sometimes inquired informally about the game. 
The subjects often asked each other who they had been during the game, receiving the reply as 
new information far more often than as confirmation of suspicions. Subjects, some of whom we 
knew well from classes and experiments, did note some problems. For example, we had to 
exclude a set of 24 rounds from our data because one subject stopped participating. After the 
final experiments when we could talk to subjects who would not play again, we asked seriously 
about identifying other subjects, manipulation of the games, and opinions about research 
objectives. No one reported confidence in identifying their fellow subjects. Proctors and 
recorders confirmed that they did not know subjects’ identities with any reliability, and we were 
not able to identify subjects when we served as proctors.  The only reported case of manipulation 
was that one a subject accepted a payment of one cent to see how we would pay him.  No one 
expressed any understanding of our research objectives beyond the level presented in the 
instructions. (See appendix 2.) 
 
6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
We ran 441 rounds of experiments for money, which is excluding the initial practice round 
whenever a new subject participated. As mentioned, four sessions of six payment rounds were 
excluded because one subject did not participate actively causing an ambiguity of whether the 
games were between five or six players. Of the remaining 417 rounds, there were 351 in which 
all subjects had participated in at least six previous payment rounds.  In one round we 
accidentally used a quota of less than half the votes, leaving 350 valid observations.  Fifty-nine 
of these form a pre-study for another investigation and do not relate to our current analysis.  It 
was during one of these pre-study rounds that a player received a payment of one cent. Thus we 
address 291 observations in this paper, of which 288 have all control data. 
 
Thirty-one subjects participated in the experiment rounds used in this analysis.  Each was the 
largest player in terms of votes for between one and 26 valid observation rounds.  We are 
missing demographic control data for one subject who was the largest player for three valid 
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observation rounds.  Twenty subjects were male, 4 were foreign, 16 were individualist, 14 were 
pro-social, 4 risk averse, 4 risk loving, 15 risk neutral, and 7 gave inconsistent answers in the risk 
instrument.   
 
We used 19 vote profiles that can be considered from several perspectives (see Table 2 and 
Figure 1).  We sampled most profiles between 11 and 20 times.  We sampled one profile 35 
times in order to gain a ‘large’ sample size for one specific profile.  Through copying errors we 
created two profiles accidentally and used one of them once and the other four times.   
 
The profiles fall into 7 power-identical sets.  Within each of these 7 sets, each player by rank 
has the same power as the same ranked player in each of the other profiles. That is, the largest 
player in each profile in each set has the same power index value for each given power index.  
Likewise, all the smallest players have the same power. Three of these sets are sampled in large 
enough numbers to allow for effective statistical analysis (see profiles pi, ri and si in Table 2).  A 
fourth may be aggregated with a very similar profile to create a sample size of 48 (see profiles ti 
and u1 in Table 2).   
 
Table 3 shows that the individual characteristics of gender, nationality, risk orientation and 
risk aversion had no significant effect on our experimental results. Not only were the coefficients 
statistically insignificant they were of low magnitude. Given their coefficients and means, taking 
any personal control variable to an extreme value of zero would have affected percentage 
earnings by less than one percent.   
 
Tables 2 and 4 with figure 1 present our main results.  The sample means for each profile are 
equal to or higher than the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf index values and well below the 
Johnston and Burgin-Shapley values.  For the set of profiles with the largest sample size (pi), the 
sample mean (0.337) is arguably coincident with the value (0.333) for the former two indices
8 
and widely divergent from the value (0.533) for the latter two indices. For the other three cases, 
the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf index values fall near the lower bound of 95% confidence 
interval
9 around the profile sample means.  In all cases, the remaining two power indices fall far 
above the confidence interval.  
 
These results lead to four conclusions.  
1.  Power indices can predict human voting outcomes in appropriate environments.  
2.  The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are reasonably good predictors (at least).  
3.  These two power indices do not overstate the voting power of large voting blocks, and  
4.  the Johnston and Burgin-Shapley indices do overstate the voting power of large voting 
blocks. 
 
                                                 
8 Profiles pi also approximate the power distribution in 40 percent of top 400 UK publicly held corporations 
(Leach 2002). 
9 Note that data was effectively bimodal with values varying depending upon whether the largest player 
was in the winning coalition or not. As such, we used calculations similar to those used standard 
statistical test for stratified sampling to obtain the confidence interval estimates. The mean and standard 
error for the largest player’s earnings when not part of the winning coalition were of course zero.   
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Although the Shapley-Shubik index for P power coincides with the Banzhaf index for I power 
for the profiles we used (and rarely differed substantially for any profile we checked), 
conceptually P power and I power are different.  Our experiment structurally addressed P power, 
and so the results apply to P power and conform fairly closely to the primary model of P power, 
the Shapley-Shubik index.     
 
The significance of our results is that they provide empirical support for the first time that the 
Shapley-Shubik provides a solid foundation for the investigation of P type rivalrous voting 
power.  Our empirical results suggest that previous studies showing weak applicability of power 
indices are driven by the environments of those studies differing substantially from the axiomatic 
foundation of power indices.  Future research may focus upon the generalization of power 





The experiments work well procedurally as suggested by the match of experimental results 
with power indices and the insignificance of control variables. 
 
The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are empirically indistinguishable over most vote 
profiles, while they are easily distinguishable from Johnston and Burgin-Shapley indices. Our 
results support the Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf indices or both as approximations of voting 
power in an environment with homogenous players with orthogonal interests. However, they 
may understate the power of large players in that environment.   This result contrasts with other 
studies that suggest these indices overstate the power of large players in naturally occurring 
environments of heterogeneous players with shared interests.  The next question is how shared 
interest and heterogeneity of players affects the application of power indices to non-experimental 
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Characteristics of the player with the most votes per round 
    Number Mean St  Dev Min Median Max 
     
       
       
       
               
               
            
           
          
         
        
               
       
             
         
         
       
% Earnings  291  0.354 0.228 0  0.400 0.733 
SS, Shapley-Shubik  291  0.328 0.030 0.267 0.333 0.400 
B, Banzhaf  291  0.327 0.028 0.267 0.333 0.393 
J, Johnston  291  0.503 0.054 0.381 0.533 0.574 
BS, Burgin-Shapley 
 
291  0.508 0.051 0.389 0.533 0.574 
Male 291  0.725 0.447 0 1 1
Foreign 291  0.076 0.265 0 0 1
PersI,  Individualist 291  0.505 0.501 0 1 1
RiskA, Risk Averse  288  0.167 0.373 0  0  1 
RiskL, Risk Loving  288  0.128 0.335 0  0  1 






Earnings  SS B J BS Gender  Foreign  PersI
Risk 





SS 0.166  1.000
B 0.161  0.999  1.000
J 0.104  0.921  0.936 1.000
BS 0.122  0.932  0.947 0.994 1.000
Male -0.016  0.021  0.018 -0.005 -0.004 1.000
Foreign
 
0.007 -0.061 -0.061 -0.055 -0.047 -0.464 1.000




-0.001 -0.028 -0.025 -0.012 -0.012 0.004 -0.001 0.071 1.000
RiskA -0.097 -0.122 -0.125 -0.130 -0.128 -0.305 0.503 0.447 0.177 1.000
RiskN 0.085 0.075 0.079 0.088 0.081 0.071 -0.304 -0.042 0.455 -0.514 1.000
RiskL -0.019 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.011 0.238 -0.110 -0.363 0.152 -0.172 -0.442 1
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Profile S.S.  Banz. B.S.  John. n  w   w  
p1 = {31:11,10,10,10,10,10}  0.333 0.333 0.533 0.533 18 0.381
p2 = {36:14,12,12,11,11,11}  0.333 0.333 0.533 0.533 20 0.423
p3 = {22:8,7,7,7,7,7}  0.333 0.333 0.533 0.533 17 0.351
p4 = {16:11,4,4,4,4,4}  0.333 0.333 0.533 0.533 35 0.298
p5 = {20:14,5,5,5,5,5}  0.333 0.333 0.533 0.533 20 0.296
p6 = {12:8,3,3,3,3,3}  0.333 0.333 0.533 0.533 17 0.280
p7 = {18:9,7,5,5,5,4}  0.333 0.333 0.533 0.533 1  0.667
0.337 
r1 = {13:8,4,3,3,3,3}  0.367 0.362 0.558 0.551 14 0.300
r2 = {18:10,7,5,4,4,4}  0.367 0.362 0.558 0.551 15 0.484
r3 = {9:5,3,2,2,2,2}  0.367  0.362  0.558 0.551  14 0.393
0.395 
s1 = {10:5,3,3,3,2,2}  0.317 0.317 0.493 0.479 12 0.289
s2 = {25:10,8,8,8,7,7}  0.317 0.317 0.493 0.479 15 0.369
s3 = {13:6,4,4,4,3,3}  0.317 0.317 0.493 0.479 11 0.394
0.351 
t1 = {24:10,8,8,7,7,6}  0.300 0.300 0.453 0.435 12 0.433
t2 = {18:8,6,6,5,5,4}  0.300 0.300 0.453 0.435 12 0.406
t3 = {36:14,12,12,11,11,10}  0.300 0.300 0.453 0.435 4  0.400
u1 = {18:7,6,6,6,5,5}  0.300 0.300 0.438 0.438 20 0.178
0.317 
v1 = {22:8,7,7,7,7,6}  0.267 0.267 0.389 0.381 22 0.336  
w1 = {13:8,5,3,3,3,3}  0.400 0.393 0.574 0.574 12 0.581  
 
S.S. = Shapley-Shubik Index 
Banz. = Banzhaf Index 
B.S. = Burgan Shapley Index 
John. = Johnston Index 
n = Number of rounds played 
w = Average percentage won by largest player 
w = Average of w  across a number of power-identical sets 
Mean for all relatively equal pi profiles (p1-p3) is 0.387 with n of 55. 
Mean for all relatively unequal pi profiles (p4-p7) is 0.298 with n of 73. 
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TABLE 3:  REGRESSION OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
 
Linear Regression Analysis             
n  288  s  0.22679  d      
R
2 0.039727  Adj R
2 0.019223 Raw R
2 0.716735   
                    
Tests, etc, for Individual Coefficients          
         H0: Coefficient = 0    Confidence Ints. 
   Coeff.     H1: Coefficient ≠ 0  Level 0.95 
Variable  (est.)  Std Err  T  p-value  Lower  Upper 
1  -0.01913  0.152059  -0.12578 0.899994 -0.31843  0.28018 
SS  1.195785  0.45004  2.657063 0.008329 0.309948 2.081622 
Male  -0.00323  0.037845  -0.08547 0.931951 -0.07773  0.071257 
Foreign  0.06142  0.063227  0.971429 0.332161 -0.06303  0.185872 
PersI  -0.01576  0.034636  -0.45491 0.64952 -0.08393  0.05242 
RiskA  -0.0658  0.046732  -1.40792 0.160248 -0.15778  0.02619 




TABLE 4:  CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 
 
 




pi 128  0.337 0.007 0.322-0.351  0.333  0.533 
ri 43  0.395 0.017 0.360-0.429  0.362  0.551 
si 38  0.351 0.013 0.324-0.377  0.317  0.479 
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FIGURE 1   




















From left to right, the profiles for each column of values are: v1 at SS=26.7%, ti and u1 at 
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 APPENDIX 1: RISK AVERSION INSTRUMENT 
 
In this section the alternatives are different chances that you will receive different amounts of money, given that we select your 
reply. We will select twenty replies for this section and each of these twenty will have the following chances to win the following 
rewards. 
 
Consider this example: 
 
   A   B   C 
(10) Chance:  100%  50%  10%  
Winnings $5.00  $10.00  $50.00 
 
Suppose that this reply was one of the twenty we chose for payment. If you selected alternative A, we would give you five 
dollars. IF you chose B we would flip a coin, and if it came up ‘heads’ we would give you ten dollars. If you chose C we would 
roll a ten sided dice, and if it came up 10, we would give you fifty dollars. 
 
Choose and circle A, B or C for each of the following alternatives. 
 
   A  B   C 
(10) Chance:  100%  50%  10%   
Winnings $5.00  $10.00  $50.00 
 
   A   B   C 
(11) Chance:  100%  50%  10% 
Winnings $4.00  $12.00  $40.00 
   A   B   C 
(12) Chance:  100%  50%  10% 
Winnings $4.50  $10.00  $45.00 
 
   A   B   C 
(13) Chance:  100%  50%  10% 
Winnings $4.00  $10.00  $40.00 
 
 
Note: This is not part of questionnaire. Risk loving answers are: C,C,C,C; C,B,C,B; and C,B,C,C. Risk neutral answers are: B,B,B,B; 
A,B,B,B; and C,B,B,B. Risk averse answers are: A,A,A,A; A,B,A,B; and A,B,A,A. Other combinations are intransitive. 
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APPENDIX2: SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Note that this appendix will be available from the authors by website or email request for the proceedings of the 
conference. 
 
Player Instructions for the Power Index Game 
 
You’re about to become a ‘player’ in an experimental game that investigates the 
influence that voting power of electoral groups has on democratic decisions. Confusing? 
A player could represent a political party and all its voters or a corporate board member 
where votes could be the number of your shares. The procedures are really quite simple 
and you get to make some big money! 
 
The Game is as Follows: 
 
-  You will be divided into groups, but you won’t know whom you’re playing against. 
-  You will communicate only through open First Class chat rooms (not private). 
-  You will be given a username such as player A, or B. 
-  A game consists of twelve rounds. 
-  In each round you are allocated a different number of votes, e.g. 12 or 2 votes. 
-  In each round your group has between $15 to divide democratically. 
-  Division of money is done by offering a proposal, and accepting the proposal. 
-  Each round goes for a maximum of 5 minutes. 
-  At the end of all the rounds you get the sum of what you earned in CASH. 
 




It is difficult to grasp the relationship between votes and power and so is getting used to 
the games notation. 
 




This tells us that: 
-  We are in round 5 
-  Player A has 41 votes 
-  Player B has 35 votes etc… 
-  To win this game the players who agree on a proposal must have at least 52 votes 
combined to win. 
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Lets say you are playing for $10 in this round. To offer a proposal in the open chat room 
you could use the following notation: 
 
Prop B1: A5 B5   
 
This tells us that: 
-  Player B is making his/her first proposal (prop B1) 
-  Player B offers A $5 and B $5 
-  The combined votes (if A accepts) is 76, this proposal has majority votes and is hence 
accepted. 
 
If Player A doesn’t accept and player B wishes to make a second proposal it should be 
titled Prop B2, or just B2. 
 
To accept a proposal Player A could write: 
Supports B1 
 
An example of a game for the above vote vector is as follows: 
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Enter your support 
of a proposal. 
Proctor announces 
winner for this 
round 
Negotiations 
begin; present your 
proposals here, a 
maximum of 5 
minutes before
Enter the number of 
votes you have so 
proctor knows there 
are no 
misunderstandings
Players in the 
group # 528 
Note: Example is from the pre-study with a purse of $10. 
 
Here you can see that the ‘proctor’ announces which proposal wins. Proposal A2 has 
since players A, D, and E all support A2 giving a total of exactly 53 votes. Whereby, A 
receives $5.40, E $1 and D $3.60. i.e. A 5.40, E 1, D remainder Prop A2  
 
It is also interesting to note that just because you’re allocated are large amount of votes 
doesn’t necessarily mean you will get the biggest earnings! Player B with 35 votes 
completely missed out! On one hand, Player B should have (once he realised that he may 
not get anything) offered a proposal like; Prop B2: A 8, B 2. He could then get $2 instead 
of 0.  In this case player A could be greedier and accept this proposal, forgetting any 
proposals that included players C, D, or E! 
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Playing the Game 
 
At the start of the game, the proctor will send a message:  
“About to begin round 1. Send me your votes.”  
 
 Reply stating your letter and number of votes:   
“A has 41” or “B has 35” etc. 
 
Then the proctor will announce the beginning of the round:  
“Start round 1” 
 
And the end of the round or when sufficient support is shown before a proposal:  
“End of round Prop ## wins. Stop voting” At this point no more proposals can be 
offered or accepted 
 
If a proposal appears to have enough votes to win, the proctor will call a vote. (If the 
proctor has not noticed support for a proposal, you may send a message pointing out that 
a proposal has received enough support.)  The proctor will say, for example, ‘Call for 
votes.’  At that time you cast a vote for one proposal: ‘I vote for PropE89’.   There is no 
need to vote against a proposal because the Proctor will count no reply as a vote against.  
So, if you want a proposal to pass, vote for it even if it is your proposal.  Proctors will 
declare if a proposal has passed or not.   
 
-  It is also not imperative that you stick to the notation examples, plain English is fine, 
however we have found that short hand is easily understood.  
-  A good message could be ‘Prop F43 is nearly winning.  Hey F, C&D and I will give 
you more.  B 3.25 C 2.00 D 2.00 F 2.75: PropB46.’ 
-  You can argue about a proposal, try to persuade other players to support your 
proposal…whatever gets you the most money! 
 
You will want to find other players whose votes can be added to yours to equal or exceed 
the minimum votes required to divide the money.  You get them to cooperate with you by 
offering them some of the money.  Of course, you want to keep as much as you can for 
yourself.  Other players will propose deals that give you nothing. Perhaps you can get 
some of them to share with you by offering them more than their current deal.   
 




-  No Private Chat rooms are allowed! 
 
-  You are not allowed to make references to the world outside of the game.  You may 
not use your names or any other real world identifier. You may not make side deals 
such as offers to do homework for or threats of violence to other players in the game.  
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Players who violate these rules will forfeit their earnings and be removed from the 
game 
 
-  Be Greedy! Try to get as much money as possible. In previous experiments players 
have earned $60 after a couple of rounds! Don’t feel sorry for players with a small 
amount of votes. You never know in the next round they could have the majority! 
 
-  If you identify two proposals with the same number and one of them passes, we will 




Let us review.  In each round of this game you will divide $10 between yourself and 
other players.  You will get some votes which may change between every round. You 
will use a Group chat room to discuss how the money should be divided.  You will vote 
on who gets the money in the Group chat.  Whatever you earn in this game is yours to 
keep.   
 
Consider some possible strategies.  You could: 
 
o  Look at every player’s votes to see what combinations can win. 
 
o  Who can help you?  Who can you help?   
 
o  Are any players dependent on your votes in particular? 
 
o  Make offers quickly hoping to make big earnings before others catch on. 
 
o  If you are left out of a proposal, think of a way to divide the money so that some 
of the players in the proposal get more by voting with you and your votes are 
enough with theirs to create a majority.  That is, break up coalitions that leave you 
out.   
 
 
Please keep several points in mind: 
 
-  You are playing for real money. 
 
-  You may earn nothing in this experiment. 
 
-  You don’t know who is in your group and you cannot speak during rounds 
 
-  Check the Votes Vector area because votes may change between rounds. 
 
-  Be careful not to close the group chat room or the vote vector. 
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-  It is a majority of votes, not of players that decides how the money gets divided. 
 
-  You may not offer any deal that involves anything from outside of the game.  That is, 
you cannot offer to do someone’s homework or threaten them to make them 
cooperate with a deal. 
 
-  Every majority coalition of players can be broken. 
 
-  This game is divided into rounds.  In each round, your group of players will divide 
$10 among yourselves.   
 
-  Each round will last up to five minutes, but may be shorter if players reach an 
agreement sooner.  Any later and no one gets any money 
 
-  Keep an eye out for bogus proposals.  Player B for example names a proposal ‘D2’.  
This is technically possible, against the rules, probably pointless and silly, but it could 
cause confusion. 
 
-  Make sure that your proposals contain players that will give you the minimum 
amount of votes ‘To win’. For example if B has 35 and C has 2 votes, To win is 52, 
then Prop B1 B5, C5 cannot work since the summation of the votes is only 37 
 
-  Make sure your proposals add up! If you’re dividing $10, make sure that you don’t 
offer B1 B9, C5. This adds up to $14…not $10  
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